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The U.S. Farm Export Boom: 
How Will It Be Shaped by Global 
Infrastructure?
By Alan Barkema and Mark Drabenstott
A
 recent surge in U.S. agricultural exports
has triggered a wave of optimism about
the industry’s prospects in the world
food market. At the root of the industry’s recent
export gains are rapidly growing populations
and incomes across Asia and Latin America.
Adding fuel to U.S. agriculture’s newfound op-
timism is the recent emergence of China—the
world’s most populous nation and most rapidly
growing economy—as a net importer of food.
The world food market may not live up to
current expectations, however, without substantial
investment in food processing and distribution
infrastructure in developing countries. Much of
the developing world has limited capacity to
process and distribute food, whether imported
or produced domestically. For example, in China
and Mexico—two of U.S. agriculture’s most
promising markets—the existing transportation
and distribution systems are inadequate to meet
current food system needs. Such infrastructure
limitations could become a crucial bottleneck
for exports of some U.S. farm commodities. At
the same time, however, exports of other kinds
of products, including U.S. farm and food tech-
nology, could be strengthened by efforts to
upgrade the infrastructure supporting the food
systems in the developing world.
This article examines how an inadequate food
system infrastructure in the developing world
may affect U.S. agriculture’s prospects in the
world food market. The first section assesses the
potential size of the world food market. The
second section evaluates how limitations in food
system  infrastructure in developing countries
could limit that potential, focusing on China and
Mexico as illustrative case studies. The third
section considers implications of infrastructure
limitations for U.S. farm and food exports. The
article concludes that inadequate infrastructure
could tilt U.S. exports toward food technology
and products and away from traditional bulk
commodities.
WHERE IS THE WORLD FOOD
MARKET GROWING?
U.S. agriculture is facing its best prospects in
the world market since the 1970s. Economic
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the article.growth continues in traditional developed mar-
kets, such as Europe, Japan, and Canada. What
makes the period ahead especially promising is
the potential for a number of small and large
developing countries to increase food purchases
substantially. Countries across Asia and Latin
America are experiencing rapid growth in both
their economies and their populations. Thus, not
only is food need growing, but consumers in-
creasingly have the incomes to improve their
diets. Based on the forces at work, Asia and
Latin America appear to hold particularly bright
prospects for U.S. exporters of food and agricul-
tural products.
Before looking ahead, it should be recognized
that Asia and Latin America already have made
a big impact on U.S. agricultural exports. Five
of the top seven markets for the nation’s agricul-
tural exports in 1995—Japan, Mexico, Korea,
Taiwan, and China—are in Asia and Latin
America. While the industrial countries of the
European Union are still a big market for U.S.
farm products, the European share of U.S. agri-
culture’s exports has declined, shrinking from a
fourth a decade ago to about a seventh in 1995
(Chart 1). Meanwhile, Asia has quietly become
U.S. agriculture’s dominant customer. Together
Japan, China, and a cluster of other high-growth
nations around Asia’s Pacific Rim now account
for nearly 40 percent of the industry’s foreign
sales. China’s imports of U.S. farm products
have tripled in the last few years. Mexico is the
fourth-largest market overall. Sales to Mexico
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78 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYlost some steam last year due to the downturn in
the Mexican economy, but Mexico and Latin
America remain promising markets of long-
term potential. 
Recent trends in population and income promise
to make Asia and Latin America even more
attractive markets for U.S. producers in the
years ahead. Today, the world’s population is
about 6 billion. Only a fourth of the world’s
residents live in the high-income, developed
nations, while three-fourths live in the develop-
ing countries of Asia, Latin America, and Africa.
More important, populations in both Asia and
Latin America are expected to grow at a rate
faster than the world average of 1.4 percent
through the end of the century. Such growth will
run far ahead of the slight gains in population in
the developed world. While Africa will have the
fastest growing population, gains there are not
expected to increase demand in the world food
market appreciably since many of these people
will remain on subsistence diets.
Incomes may be even more important than
population in fueling future demand for U.S.
agricultural exports. Over the period beginning in
1990 and ending in 1994, countries in East Asia
enjoyed an economic boom, with growth in real
GDP averaging 8 percent a year (Chart 2). China
topped the list of Asian countries with growth of
nearly 11 percent a year. Growth was solid but
much less rapid in Latin America, averaging
3 percent for all Latin American economies,
Chart 2
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1996 79including Mexico. By contrast, economic growth
in the United States over this time period was
only 1.7 percent.
Looking ahead, economic expansion is expected
to remain brisk in Asia and Latin America, at
least through the end of the decade. Current
forecasts indicate real GDP in Asia will grow
nearly 8 percent a year through the year 2001,
led by growth of nearly 10 percent a year in
China. Growth in Latin America is expected to
average about 5 percent a year, with growth in
Mexico averaging about 4 percent a year.
Although considerably less than projections
for Asia, Latin America’s prospective growth
rate still compares favorably with projected
growth of less than 3 percent a year in the
developed world.
Rising incomes do not necessarily translate
into rising food demand, but in Asia and Latin
America they almost certainly will. Most con-
sumers in these two regions of the world have a
much more basic family budget and diet than is
commonplace in the developed world. For example,
the average per capita income is about $3,500 in
Mexico and about $500 in China. These num-
bers are probably reasonable proxies of overall
standards of living, including dietary standards.
A considerable portion of any gains in income
will likely go to improving the diet. In Mexico,
for instance, food represents about a third of
total household spending, while in China it rep-
resents about 60 percent. 
A final factor that will enhance export oppor-
tunities for U.S. producers is the likelihood that
Asia and Latin America will be unable to meet
their burgeoning food demand from domestic
sources. If current patterns continue, neither
region appears capable of increasing food pro-
duction fast enough to keep up with demand,
thereby creating market opportunities for U.S.
producers.
A good indicator of the food supply and demand
balance is per capita consumption and produc-
tion of grains (Chart 3). Grains are by far the
world’s most important food, whether con-
sumed directly or as livestock feed. A compari-
son of production and consumption throughout
various regions of the world reveals a substantial
mismatch between where food is produced and
where it is consumed. For example, the United
States and the European Union produce substan-
tial exportable surpluses of grain.
1 In contrast, in
much of the developing world—especially Asia
and Latin America—per capita production falls
well short of consumption. Multiplying these
per capita food shortfalls by the large number of
consumers in these areas reveals a substantial
food deficit to be filled by food imports.
To sum up, growing populations and incomes
in the developing world—especially Asia and
Latin America—are fueling demand for food
products. With economic growth likely to con-
tinue in these two regions, and with domestic
production insufficient to satisfy demand, U.S.
producers can expect growing markets abroad
for U.S. food products. 
WILL INFRASTRUCTURE
CONSTRAIN THE WORLD FOOD
MARKET?
Growth in population and incomes will clearly
be the fundamentals lifting potential food demand
in the developing world. Yet for this potential to
be realized, substantial investments in food sys-
tem infrastructure will be required in many nations
(see box). The flow of imported commodities
and food products will depend on logistical and
distribution systems. The ability to transform
farm commodities into food products will depend
on the developing world’s food processing tech-
nology. And the extent to which developing
countries supply their own food needs will
depend on investments in agricultural resources
80 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYand production technology. Thus, while growth in
income and population points to an optimistic
rate of growth in world food demand, infrastructure
investment could significantly temper the outlook.
Infrastructure needs range in size and scope
throughout the developing world and thus make
a global assessment of investment needs extremely
difficult. A better approach may be to assess
infrastructure needs in a couple of key countries
and then examine how the nature and pace of
investment will affect the food market in those
countries. China and Mexico offer useful case
studies. Both countries will be important mar-
kets for U.S. agriculture, yet each faces unique
challenges in upgrading the infrastructure that
underpins their respective food markets. China’s
infrastructure needs appear great and diverse—
from improving its capacity to produce agri-
cultural products to better distribution systems.
Mexico’s challenge, on the other hand, is upgrad-
ing its transportation infrastructure.
China’s infrastructure challenges
How much food—and what type of food—
China imports over the next decade and beyond
will depend on how much food can be produced
domestically and how well both imported and
domestic foodstuffs can be distributed. Thus,
investments in China’s capacity to produce food
and improve distribution systems loom large in
assessing China’s potential as a market for U.S.
farmers and food companies. 
Chart 3
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1996 81While the extent to which China can boost
food production is currently an object of wide-
spread debate, there is general consensus that
gains will come only if China raises the level of
its agricultural technology and expands its sup-
ply of water for irrigation. Both efforts will
require substantial investments that will have to
compete with surging capital demands in other
parts of the Chinese economy.
Many observers agree that China’s investment
in agricultural research will be the critical factor
in governing its future food supply. As China’s
economy has grown rapidly in recent years, state
funding for agricultural research has suffered.
Western economists have recently reported that
most Chinese agricultural research institutes—
still run wholly by the state—have resorted to
producing commercial crops just to pay wages
to staff scientists (Crook). Staffing has been all
the more difficult due to an exodus of scientists
from agricultural research to other sectors of the
economy and to declining enrollments in agri-
cultural universities.
The cutback in support for agricultural
research by the Chinese government has been
dramatic. When the liberalization of agriculture
began in 1978, China was spending nearly 14.0
percent of the state budget on agricultural sciences
(Chart 4). By 1993, that portion had shrunk to
just 8.4 percent. Moreover, not only is agricul-
ture’s share of state spending declining, more of
its funds are paying for “administration” workers
instead of basic research. When agricultural
research was a top budget priority in 1978, a
third of the funds were spent on research
equipment. By 1993 that share had dwindled
to a fifth.
The research cutbacks are having two impacts
on Chinese agriculture. First, with fewer advances
in plant genetics, the rate of increase in Chinese
grain yields appears to be slowing. Second,
strained research funds have hampered China’s
ability to respond to threats to its agricultural
production from pests and disease. Both cotton
and shrimp production have been hurt in recent
years by pests and disease, with only a limited
response from Chinese research institutes.
Water is another critical constraint on Chinese
agriculture. Much of northern China, including
the fertile North China plain, will soon exhaust
all of the irrigation water available from the
nearest source, the Yellow River. In some areas,
the water needs of cities and coalfields are
already diverting water from irrigation. If cur-
rent trends continue, some observers predict that
millions of hectares of productive land could go
fallow due to a lack of water (Goldberg).
Despite the prospect of mounting food demand,
investment in irrigation projects remains mea-
ger. The major water project in China today, the
Three Gorges Dam, has dominated Chinese
spending on water projects, leaving few funds
for other pressing needs, such as the proposed
South-North Water Transfer project, which
would funnel water to the fertile North China
plain. Moreover, the Three Gorges Dam will not
even significantly increase the flow of water
to irrigation—its primary goal is to generate
electrical power and control flooding on the
Yangtze River. Some small projects are under
way in other parts of China with assistance from
the World Bank. The additional supply of water
created by such projects, however, could be
exhausted in a few years.
In sum, a limited supply of water and the pros-
pect of little additional investment in irrigation
projects will be a significant brake on China’s
agricultural production. Although the precise
extent of this constraint is not fully under-
stood, a lack of water appears likely to boost
Chinese imports of grain and other agricultural
commodities.
82 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYThe final investment issue facing China is
transportation infrastructure. China’s transporta-
tion systems are weak, and agriculture must
compete for its share of the strained capacity
with other burgeoning sectors of the economy.
Grain traffic by rail has increased substantially
over the past decade, but grain still accounts for
just 5 percent of total rail cargo (Nyberg). Overall,
rail transportation is so inadequate that a surplus
of feed grains in North China cannot be moved
to areas in the South clamoring for more grain.
An issue of overriding importance to U.S. and
western exporters will be China’s capacity to
import grain and foodstuffs through its over-
crowded ports and then distribute the imports
over its outdated railways and highways. Port
capacity is a major problem. While seaport cargo
capacity doubled from 1986 to 1994, the gains
were for mostly small ships. Seaport berths
that can accommodate larger vessels typical in
world grain trade are estimated to number fewer
than a dozen (Nyberg). Moreover, poor dock
equipment and facilities make unloading grain
extremely slow. Unloading a medium-sized grain
ship (35,000 to 40,000 tons) can take 10 to 11
days in China, about half again the time required
in Japan. China has only two ports that can accom-
modate larger grain vessels that represent the
low-cost standard today, and these ports have
limited dock equipment.
Alleviating this port bottleneck will require
major investments. The World Bank has estimated
Chart 4
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1996 83that a minimum of $2.5 billion will be needed
simply to convert some of China’s existing
cargo berths to handle grain. The estimate jumps
higher if new berths are built to accommodate
bigger vessels.
Ports will not be the only bottleneck. In
most nations, grain leaves ships and is quickly
and efficiently transferred to domestic railways—
so-called bulk intermodal transport. Such ship-
ments in China are possible only between one
port and Beijing. Other systems are under devel-
opment in the northeast and in the southwest, but
capacity remains small relative to the potential
demand (Nyberg).
The infrastructure needs in China clearly hold
far-reaching implications for U.S. and other west-
ern exporters. If China’s investment in agricul-
tural research and water supplies continues to
flag, the gap between China’s food demand and
supply is sure to widen. This will spell growing
opportunity for U.S. sellers of commodities and
processed foods. Yet the yawning gap between
demand and supply will also pose a dilemma for
Chinese leaders, and it remains unclear how
many food imports they will allow.
2 Regardless
of how much food China can produce itself, the
nation’s inadequate port and transportation sys-
tem poses a serious bottleneck for U.S. and other
exporters. At the same time, the bottleneck may
present opportunities for western companies to
form joint ventures to upgrade China’s transpor-
tation systems. Some multinational food compa-
nies appear to be considering such investments.
Mexico’s infrastructure challenge
Mexico appears to have less daunting infra-
structure needs than China in the period ahead.
In part, this reflects the fact that Mexico’s econ-
omy and its agriculture are further developed
than China’s. Mexico’s major need over the next
several years will be upgrading its transporta-
tion infrastructure. Despite its proximity to the
United States and the convenience of a long
overland border, transporting food and agricul-
tural products within Mexico can be costly and
time-consuming. Thus, distributional bottle-
necks could be a brake on the growth of the
Mexican food market. Improvements to truck,
rail, and maritime infrastructure will be espe-
cially critical to accommodate the trade that
seems  likely to develop under NAFTA. 
Truck traffic accounts for nearly three-fourths
of Mexico’s food and agricultural shipments,
but only because it is a better alternative than rail
and maritime transport. Shipments by truck are
much more expensive in Mexico than in the
United States, in part because the road systems
will generally not handle large trucks over a long
distance. To move long distances, most ship-
ments are moved through a series of shorter
hauls—a much less efficient system. Nearly
2,500 miles of limited access four-lane high-
ways have been built in recent years between
major cities in Mexico. These are all toll roads,
however, and tolls are extremely expensive—
ranging from 35 to 90 cents a mile. As a result,
many trucks resort to public roads, leading to
further deterioration in already poor highways.
Currently, 61 percent of Mexican roads are in
poor condition, 29 percent are in fair condition,
and only 10 percent are in good condition. Fi-
nally, current regulations prohibit U.S. trucks
from traveling more than 20 miles beyond the
border. That will change by 2003, when trans-
portation rules between the two countries will
be eliminated (Economic Research Service). But
for now, U.S. goods must be transferred to more
costly Mexican carriers once they cross the border.
Looking ahead, there will be a huge need for
upgrading Mexico’s roadways. A recent World
Bank survey of Mexican businesses ranked
highways as the leading constraint to eco-
nomic development in Mexico (World Bank).
84 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYAlthough no estimate of the capital required is
available, it will likely run into the tens of bil-
lions of dollars. More than $6 billion of private
capital has been invested in the new toll roads
of the 1990s. The need to upgrade the country’s
much more extensive network of public roads
will swamp that investment. There is clearly a
long way to go; in 1993, the $2 billion in private
investment in toll roads was three times all
public investment in roads.
Railways should be a major conduit for U.S.
food and agricultural products flowing into
Mexico, but shipping by rail is a costly alterna-
tive in Mexico. Rail services are provided exclu-
sively by the national railway (FNM) with
outdated equipment. There are no refrigerated
rail cars in Mexico, for example, and this forces
many food products off rail cars at the border
and onto trucks. Inflexible work arrangements
and high mandatory crew counts cut efficiency
and push up costs. It is estimated that labor
productivity in FNM is only one-eleventh the
average for the U.S. rail industry (Agricultural
Marketing Service). Finally, Mexican tracks are
unable to handle the weight of standard U.S. rail
cars, requiring smaller cars at higher total cost.
Major investments will be needed to upgrade
Mexico’s tracks and rail equipment. In addition,
greater competition will be needed to increase
the overall efficiency of the rail system. Both
problems could be solved by recent proposals
from the Mexican government to privatize FNM
and permit foreign firms to hold minority shares
in joint ventures. The Mexican government is
also considering a plan that would permit U.S.
rail companies to operate their trains on Mexi-
can rails.  Regardless of the exact path reform
takes, overhauling the Mexican rail system will
probably take several years to accomplish.
Finally, maritime shipping is vital to transport-
ing grain to Mexico, but again this mode of
transportation is costly and inefficient compared
with the United States. Port facilities are poor,
especially for accommodating intermodal trans-
shipments common in the grain industry. Ships
take a long time to unload, and bureaucratic
delays at customs only extend timetables. More-
over, routes from Mexican ports to inland cities
are poorly developed. 
Improved port facilities will be needed to ac-
commodate increased food and agricultural
trade, but more efficient inland distribution is
probably more important. The Mexican govern-
ment has made intermodal transportation a pri-
ority and is expanding the capacity to handle and
distribute container shipments. Thus, maritime
infrastructure may not be a major factor limiting
the development of Mexico’s food market in the
period ahead.
Overall, infrastructure will be a factor influ-
encing U.S. food and agricultural exports to
Mexico, but less so than to China. Whereas
Chinese infrastructure investments appear
likely to affect both the growth and the type of
U.S. exports, transportation problems in Mexico
seem likely to affect mostly the rate of growth.
Moreover, U.S. firms will probably be major
participants in upgrading the Mexican transpor-
tation system. Nevertheless, considerable in-
vestment is needed, and distribution bottlenecks
and high transportation costs will curtail U.S.




The world food market of the future holds both
much promise and considerable uncertainty for
U.S. agriculture. On one hand, rapidly growing
populations and incomes in China, Mexico, and
other high-growth countries in the developing
world promise to fuel demand for the industry’s
ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1996 85myriad products. On the other hand, antiquated
food system infrastructure in these otherwise
promising  new markets may limit the industry’s
sales. This prospective infrastructure constraint
adds yet another dimension to the already net-
tlesome problem of forecasting and planning for
growth in U.S. agriculture’s sales to China,
Mexico, and other new markets in the develop-
ing world. In view of these considerations, what
is the most likely outlook for U.S. agricultural
exports in the years ahead?
A precise, quantifiable answer is difficult to
determine, but it is possible to frame possible
outcomes under different scenarios. Given the
foregoing discussion, the most important parame-
ters to consider in the analysis are consumer
incomes in the importing countries—a key deter-
minant of food demand—and the nature of the
likely infrastructure constraint on food imports.
Implications for different kinds of U.S. agricul-
tural exports can then be considered under vari-
ous combinations of consumer incomes and
food system infrastructure.
It is useful first to consider the effect of rising
consumer incomes on the development of a
country’s food system, apart from any limita-
tions inadequate infrastructure may place on
food imports. Low household incomes in many
developing countries constrain the amount of
disposable income available for spending on
food and other items. Instead, a substantial por-
tion of the average diet in low-income countries
is often produced at home, and minimal food
purchases are generally raw or unprocessed
foods. As a result food systems are poorly devel-
oped. In China, for example, per capita incomes
average less than $500 per year and per capita
production in the food system is only $70 a year
(Chart 5).
Food systems become more highly developed
as spending on more highly processed foods
climbs with rising incomes. In Mexico, for
example, average per capita income of about
$3,600 boosts per capita production in the food
system to about $325. With higher incomes,
spending first rises for foods in which processing
has added relatively little value to raw agricultural
commodities, such as processed fats and oils and
meat and dairy products. As incomes rise still
further, consumers can afford more highly pro-
cessed food products, including some packaged
goods that add more convenience and variety to
household diets. Thus, rising incomes tend to tilt
food demand from unprocessed food commodi-
ties to processed food products. The result is
growing demand for imports of food processing
technology and processed food products.
Similarly, infrastructure limitations may also
shift the mix of agricultural products purchased
from the United States and other exporters. Spe-
cifically, inadequate infrastructure can limit im-
ports of some kinds of products while creating
a stronger market for others, including the tech-
nology that could help correct the infrastructure
obstacles. The framework sketched in Table 1 offers
some insights about which products hold the
greatest promise in China, Mexico, and other coun-
tries where inadequate infrastructure is an issue.
Two scenarios are considered. In the first sce-
nario, a developing nation—like China or Mex-
ico—establishes a policy of upgrading its
domestic food production capacity, with the in-
tent of providing a solid, basic diet for its citi-
zens. Under this scenario, domestic production
of raw farm commodities may rise, offsetting
and thus weakening somewhat the demand for
U.S. farm commodities. The market for exports
of U.S. farm technology, however, may be
somewhat stronger, as the developing nation
searches for ways to gear up its farm output.
With scarce funds channeled primarily into im-
proving the farm production infrastructure, food
processing and distribution bottlenecks would
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added food products might still be relatively
strong, especially among that portion of the
population that could afford them. With imports
of value-added food products up, demand for
additional food processing technology may be
relatively weak. Overall, this scenario brightens
the market outlook for U.S. farm technology
companies and U.S. food companies.
In the second scenario, the developing nation
chooses to channel its scarce capital into im-
proving its food processing and distribution in-
frastructure. In this scenario, the nation takes
less interest in boosting its domestic production
capability and instead relies more heavily on
farm commodities from abroad. Thus, farm
commodity imports would be stronger than in
the first scenario, while farm technology exports
would be weaker. Investments in the food pro-
cessing and distribution infrastructure would be
reflected in bigger imports of food processing
and distribution technology, including food proces-
sing, handling, and transportation equipment.
On the other hand, imports of value-added food
products would probably be weak since there
would be a large supply of farm commodities
and new technology for making commodities
into food products. This scenario brightens the
market outlook for U.S. producers and exporters
of grains and other commodities and for U.S.
food processing companies who could market
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1995, World Development Indicators.
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ECONOMIC REVIEW · THIRD QUARTER 1996 87their technology abroad directly or in foreign
joint ventures.
Which of these two scenarios best fits the
outlook for U.S. agricultural exports to China
and Mexico depends on the course of infrastruc-
ture investment in the two nations. The first
scenario, with an investment focus on farm pro-
duction systems, could describe the emerging
situation in China. For example, some observers
believe significant gains in the productivity of
Chinese agriculture could be obtained with in-
vestments in improved seed and fertilizer tech-
nology. Moreover, Chinese leaders have
expressed a keen interest in maintaining a high
degree of food self-sufficiency (Center for In-
ternational Affairs). The second scenario, with
an investment focus on distribution systems,
may be a better fit for Mexico. The food system
in Mexico has achieved a higher stage of devel-
opment than in China (Chart 5). Nevertheless,
transportation remains a significant bottleneck
that could be broken with additional infrastruc-
ture investment, paving the way for exports of
U.S. farm commodities and food processing
technology.
CONCLUSIONS
Growing populations and incomes in China,
Mexico, and other countries of Asia and Latin
America are fueling rapid growth in the world
food market. Prospects for a growing food mar-
ket have in turn created a wave of optimism in
U.S. agriculture, as the industry gears up for
bigger foreign sales. The industry’s fundamen-
tally optimistic outlook, however, may be tem-
pered somewhat by bottlenecks created by
inadequate farm and food system infrastructure
in the developing world.
The outlook varies widely for different seg-
ments of U.S. agriculture, depending on how the
developing world builds up its food system
infrastructure. Concerted efforts to boost farm
production in the developing world could bol-
ster sales for U.S. farm technology companies.
Resulting gains in foreign farm production,
however, would likely soften demand for U.S.
farm commodities. Alternatively, new invest-
ment in foreign processing and distribution sys-
tems could clear away bottlenecks for imports
of U.S. grains and other farm commodities. But
Table 1
HOW FOREIGN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS MAY AFFECT 
EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. AGRICULTURE
Developing country
infrastructure strategy: U.S. export opportunity:
Commodities Foods
Invest in Products Technology Products Technology
Production systems Weak Strong Strong Weak
Distribution systems Strong Weak Weak Strong
88 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYnew processing capability abroad could trim
demand somewhat for exports of U.S. processed
foods.
Overall, the market for U.S. farm and food
products is likely to grow in the years ahead,
although the pace will vary somewhat from
product to product. Regardless of the overall
direction and speed of the market, however, time
will be required to build and develop the infra-
structure required to sustain a bigger world food
market. Temporary bottlenecks are likely to oc-
cur from time to time, triggered by limitations
of food system infrastructure. More fundamen-
tally, where developing countries invest in food
system infrastructure will have a major impact
on which products and technology they import
from the United States. Thus, U.S. farmers and
agribusinesses gearing their business plans to
the world food market of the future should brace
themselves for occasional unforeseen shifts in
demand for their products. 
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FOR FOOD INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS?
In a global context, entrepreneurs in devel-
oping countries can tap two sources of capi-
tal to fund their projects. They can borrow
abroad or they can rely on funds generated
internally and stored in the savings accounts
of domestic citizens.
First, consider the prospects for borrowing
abroad. The total flow of capital into devel-
oping countries slowed sharply in the 1980s,
restricted by concern that large loans based
on oil revenues might not be repaid after oil
prices crashed in the early 1980s. In recent
years, markedly improved investment pros-
pects have boosted the flow of capital into
the developing world. The total capital in-
flow soared to an average of $120 billion a
year in the 1990s, cresting at $159 billion in
1993. Roughly a third of those funds flowed
into Asian countries and about a fourth into
Latin America.
3
Despite the recent surge, the flow of funds
into the developing world remains relatively
modest compared with overall global capital
flows. For example, the total inflow of capi-
tal to developing countries at its recent peak
in 1993 was still less than 1 percent of the
combined GDP of the OECD nations. In
contrast, government financial deficits in
the OECD nations were about 4 percent of
their GDP. Thus, investment in the develop-
ing world has made a relatively small dent
in global capital supplies.
While global capital supplies appear ample,
most investment in the developing world is
funded from domestic savings, with some
augmentation by international borrowing.
4
In the developing world overall, only 6 per-
cent of total investment was financed with
funds borrowed abroad during the past dec-
ade and a half. In Asia, where savings rates
are the highest in the world, borrowed funds
averaged only 2 percent of total investment.
In Latin America, where savings rates are
lower than in Asia, borrowed funds accounted
for about 5 percent of total investment in the
1980s and about 10 percent in the 1990s.
These data suggest that domestic savings
rather than funds borrowed abroad will be
the major factor determining the pace of
overall investment in the developing world
in the years ahead. Moreover, prospects for
developing country savings appear rela-
tively bright. While a wide range of factors
play a role in determining savings rates, the
demographic composition of the population
is fundamental. In developing countries, the
working-age proportion of the population is
expected to climb from about a third today
to about half by 2015, and the proportion
that is either very young or very old is ex-
pected to decline. With a bigger share of the
population working, savings rates should
rise, boosting funds available for financing
agricultural infrastructure investments and
other projects.
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1 Several other countries also regularly produce exportable
surpluses of grain, including Canada and Australia.
2 At a recent conference, Chinese officials expressed
reluctance to rely too heavily on food imports. They were
also optimistic that gains in Chinese production would
meet most of the nation’s future food needs (Center for
International Affairs).
3 This discussion draws heavily from Reisen. 
4 While global capital supplies in themselves appear ample,
all nations face certain limits on international borrowing.
These limits are not clearly defined, but instead rest on the
confidence of international investors and lenders. The
primary concern of lenders, of course, is that they will
ultimately be repaid. Thus, the greater the income
generating potential of a borrowing nation is, the greater
will be the confidence of its lenders, and the greater will be
the debt load that nation can bear. But as total external debt
rises relative to national income or GDP, international
borrowing capacity is gradually exhausted.
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Burgeoning capital needs in many differ-
ent sectors of developing country economies
will compete for available capital supplies.
Nevertheless, infrastructure investments in
agriculture should generally be able to com-
pete effectively for a healthy slice of capital.
In many developing countries, agriculture is
a low-capital, labor-intensive enterprise,
boosting the rate of return on capital invest-
ments in agriculture. In addition, food de-
mand is rising with growth in consumer
incomes, further enhancing the return on
investments in the farm and food system.
Thus, a relatively high rate of return on food
infrastructure projects should enhance their
chances of funding.
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